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OCCUPATION OF NACOGDOCHES
ROBERT 1. AND PAULINE JONES
During 1836 Nacogdoches, the Sabine, and East Texas came to be for
people of the United States more than strange names and unfamiliar loca-
tions on a map. The revolution in Texas aroused sympathy in the States and
seemed to give the administration an opportunity to improve its image at
home and perhaps secure territory it had heretofore sought without suc-
cess. Washington realized any plan made on the Potomac would emphasize
the significance of the unmarked boundary from the Gulf to Red River.
Therefore, General Edmund P. Gaines, in command of the Western De-
partment of the Army, was ordered to assume supervision of the situation
along this border. In his effort to carry out instructions, promote his own
as well as what he believed to be the wi]] of the public, and the personal de-
sire of the President, he stationed troops at Nacogdoches. This resulted in
a diplomatic break with Mexico, a bit of political legerdemain by President
Jackson, and revived, as a public issue, the long-standing rivalry among the
ranking generals of the army.
The United States and Mexico had not found a basis for the cordial
relationship each had expected when the latter became an independent
republic. Nevertheless, on April 6, 1821, they signed a treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation, the 33rd article of which provided that the
two governments would strive to maintain peace and harmony among
the Indians "who inhabit the lands adjacent to the lines and rivers which
form the boundaries of the two countries." The better to attain this objec-
tive, each "expressly" agreed to prevent Indians living in its territory from
committing hostilities against either citizens or of Indians living within the
other's jurisdiction. This provision was destined to be most troublesome. l
With the outbreak of the Texas Revolution, Indians in the northeast
who had long sought, without success, recognition of legal title to the land
on which they lived, appeared to be presented an improved bargaining po-
sition. Since Mexico had least to lose, it seemed logical, to the Anglo-Sax-
on mind, that she could afford to make greater concessions. Acting upon
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this assumption. the provisional government and many private citizens in
Texas appealed to the United States for help of any and every description.
Especial emphasis was placed upon the prevention of Indians crossing the
border to aid Mexico.2 Great sympathy as well as a desire to aid was found
in the southern states. To assure the public that the government was aware
of conditions. on December 7. 1835. President Jackson reported to Con-
gress that a policy of strict neutrality had been adopted in regard to the
situation in Texas and "it has been thought necessary to apprise the Gov-
ernment of Mexico that we should require the integrity of our territory to
be scrupulously respected by both parties."]
Washington. sensitive to public opinion, concluded that Mexican au-
thorities might seek to recruit Indians along the unmarked Arkansas-Lou-
isiana boundary to help crush the insurrection. Some of these lived or had
recently lived in the United States, therefore. their use in a military capacity
would be a violation of the treaty. Since General Gaines was at the time di-
recting the war against the Seminoles, a letter dated January 22, 1836, from
the office of the Adjutant General called his attention to the situation.-4 The
following day Secretary of War Lewis Cass sent him orders to repair to
a position near the western boundary of Louisiana and assume personal
direction of all troops along that frontier. He was told it was the duty of
the United States to tlremain entirely neutral and to cause their neutrality
to be respected." For this purpose the 6th regiment was to be ordered to
Ft. Jesup. These with troops in Western Louisiana and the country beyond
the Mississippi and south of the Missouri. he was advised, might be used
to enforce the administration's decision.s
The order reached General Gaines at New Orleans on March 28. He
set out for his new post immediately and from Baton Rouge the following
day wrote the Secretary of War that if he found "any disposition on the
part of the Mexicans or their red allies to menace our frontier, I cannot
but deem it my duty to .. anticipate their lawless movements, by cross-
ing our supposed or imaginary national boundary, and meeting the savage
marauders wherever to be found in their approach toward our frontier." In
case the department approved. he would need mounted volunteers.6
On his way toward the front, Gaines heard alarming reports of Indian
hostilities. April 4 he arrived at Natchitoches and the following day sent
Lieutenant Joseph Bonnell to the Caddo village in search of information.
At the same time he ordered commanders at Ft. Towson and Ft. Gibson to
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turn back any Texans or Mexicans who might attempt to cross the bound-
ary, also to prevent, as far as possible, Indians living in the United States
from joining in the hostilities.7
On April 8, Gaines wrote Secretary Cass that he had ordered six or
eight companies of the 7th infantry at Ft. Gibson to service between Ft.
Towson and Ft. Jesup. He also reported calls upon the governors of Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, and Tennessee for a brigade each and the governor ofAla-
bama for a battalion ofvolunteers.8 He explained to the governors that the
President considered it the duty of the United States, in accordance with
treaty obligations, "to remain entirely neutral and cause their neutrality to
be respected-peaceably, if possiblei forcibly if necessary." To implement
this decision he informed the various tribes along the border, also those
on the Red and Arkansas rivers, that the United States was determined to
prevent any incursion into Texas. He called upon the chiefs to warn their
people of the necessity for a scrupulous adherence to terms of the treaty of
1831, and explained that he would not hesitate to use the forces under his
command to prevent further violation or to punish that which had already
occurred.9
Manuel Flores, General Gaines believed, was commissioned by Mexi-
can authorities to persuade the Indians to join in a war of extermination.
He had information that this agent had recently been on Red river and pro-
duced considerable excitement among the Caddoes and other tribes, some
ofwhom had crossed into Texas. These events made it necessary for him to
decide whether or not to stop the movement by force before the whites on
both sides of the boundary were placed at the mercy of the savages. Since
it would take at least a month, which might prove fatal to a large section of
the frontier, to submit the issue to the President, and since General Gaines
believed he knew what President Jackson would say, he decided to move
ahead when a sufficient number of mounted men were available. lO
Reports of atrocities continued to reach Natchitoches. Early in the
morning ofApril 14, General Gaines was informed that some 1SOD to 2000
Indians had joined about 1000 mounted Mexicans, said to be the detach-
ment which Colonel Travis's servant Jo had reported left San Antonio af-
ter the fall of the Alamo, taking the Bastrop road. Four days earlier the
combined force was rumored to have "camped about 60 miles from Na-
cogdoches and 30 north of the road leading from that place to Trinity."
It was supposed at least 300 families lived along the route this enemy was
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reported following. I I Immediately upon receipt of the information, Gen-
eral Gaines ordered five companies of the 3rd and 8th companies of the
6th infantry to move from Ft. Jesup to the Sabine river, "where they went
into encampment on the site of Wilkinson's former camp," the place des-
ignated thereafter as Camp Sabine. These troops carried thirty-five rounds
ofammunition and twelve days rations; they also had two field pieces with
seventy-five rounds of ammunition for eachY
The General followed the troops and established his headquarters at
the camp. Along the road he "met several hundred Texians women and
children with some men retiring under the influence of great panic." Most
of these, he learned, were from the neighborhood of Nacogdoches, fleeing
from the reported victorious Mexicans and their red allies. Upon reaching
the Sabine, he was surprised to hear no confirmation of additional Indian
hostilities. He learned of only one man's having been killed and the cir-
cumstances, as reported, did not indicate a spirit of general hostility. He
decided to hold the troops east of the river but to warn the Indians, es-
pecially the Cherokees, through their chief Bowles, that the United States
would punish them if they attacked settlers along either side of the bound-
ary.1)
In the meantime, Lieutenant Bonnell had visited the Caddoes and
learned that Flores had been at the villages seeking to persuade the Indi-
ans to attack the Texans. They had refused, saying they wished to live in
peace and since all Americans were kin, if the red men attacked those on
one side of the boundary those on the other side would come and destroy
them. Gaines received Bonnell's report on April 20. The same day he wrote
Cass of the faU of the Alamo, "the runaway scrape," and Houston's retreat.
The Mexican successes, he was convinced would encourage more Indian
hostility.14
Since little unfriendly action by the Indians could be observed, he
feared the administration's policy might be questioned, the movement of
troops criticized and demands made that the call for volunteers be rescind-
ed. To guard against such possibilities, General Gaines wrote the Secretary
ofWar justification for what had been done. He pointed out that Flores was
a "zealous and efficient" agent seeking to encourage the savages to strike.
Some of the Caddoes were admittedly hesitant but most of the warriors
were away, reported to be hunting, but a number of circumstances indi-
cated they might be gathering with other and more numerous tribes on
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the upper branches of Red River where with mounted Comanches they
could descend upon settlements along the Sabine and Neches rivers. Such
a move in cooperation with the Cherokees would demoralize the frontier
by destroying hundreds of lives and millions of dollars worth ofproperty.
In view of these facts. Gaines urged that it was highly desirable for his plan
to be pursued and the volunteers be on the frontier as soon after May 1
as possible. By that time grass would be sufficient, suppJemented with a
little corn. to sustain the horses. This was also the season when water and
weather were most favorable for the troops and the Indians were most vul-
nerable. 1s
To those familiar with Indian warfare. there were other arguments
that supported the proposed concentration. The earliest possible rendez-
vous was desirable, for in fighting the redmen. experience had proved that
the best plan was to employ a sufficient number of mounted troops to
capture or punish the first offenders. Most people on the frontier believed
that should there be no fighting the presence of dragoons would he helpful
since they would encourage a spirit ofcaution in the Indians, confidence in
the settlers, and provide experience for the troops. All these were needed l
perhaps the last was the greatest weakness in the military. for it was almost
totally without topographical information essential in border warfare.16
It appears that General Gaines correctly interpreted the will of the
government, for before his report reached Washington. he was authorized
to extend activities into the disputed territory. In a letter dated April 25,
in reply to his of March 29 1 the Secretary of War notified him that the
Mexican government had been told the army should take such position as
would enable it to preserve the territory of the United States and Mexico
from Indian outrages as well as protect the territory of the United States
from violation by Mexicans. Texans, or Indians. Under no circumstances,
however, was a station to be taken beyond "Old Fort Nacogdoches which is
within the United States as claimed by Washington." In case troops did go
beyond the boundary, they would be withdrawn when the line was located.
Cass wrote "but you will please observe, that this permission will not be
exercised unless yOll find such an advanced position necessary to afford
due security to the frontier in consequence of the unsettled state of things
beyond yOll.1t17
Directions from Washington were broad and the General indicated
no desire to operate within narrow limits. On May 4 Secretary Cass wrote
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him that his call for volunteers had been approved, and since the theater
of operations was so far from the seat of government, much would be left
to his discretion. He was told, however, to keep in mind the two objectives
of his mission: first. the protection of the frontier; and second, a strict per-
formance of the neutral duties of the United States. He was cautioned to be
careful to do nothing which would give just cause of offense to any other
government and at the same time not permit the frontier to "be invaded
by any force whatever." He was to warn all concerned that he would use his
best effort to keep any troops from "marching toward our frontier" and if
such attempt were made l he would "repel and disperse it. "18
Gaines had determined to make sure his intentions and movements
were neither misunderstood nor misinterpreted below the border. On
April 25, he addressed letters to the commanders-in-chief of the Mexi-
can and Texan armies. He wrote that he was on the frontier to restrain
the Indians residing within the United States from crossing the unmarked
boundary and from committing depredations upon either side of the fine,
also to maintain the neutrality of the United States. E. A. Hitchcock., act-
ing Inspector General, was selected to deliver the message and he was au-
thorized to ufreely communicate the powers, views and purposes of the
commanding General." He was specifically instructed to warn the com-
manders against lIany movement in arms across the Sabine baYlor any of
the principal water courses emptying into that bay, or across the country
lying north thereof, and between the said waters and the Red River near
Fort Towson; or across any other part of the said unmarked or supposedly
marked boundary line between the United States and Mexico.1I He was fur-
ther authorized to inform the commanders that employment of IIIndians
belonging to, or usually residing in the nations or tribes residing on the
United States side of the above mentioned boundary line,H would bring
the entire American force against them and such summary punishment
inflicted "upon the Indians as well as those who may be found acting with
and aiding them as shall afford to the said frontier inhabitants that protec-
tion and security from the cruelties of savage war, which the laws of war
and civilized nations warrant. II General Gaines was to be represented as
believing these measures were expressly provided for in the 33rd article of
the treaty between the United States and Mexico. 19
By April 28 Gaines had received reliable reports of the battle of San
Jacinto and of rumors that the Indians were disposed to return to their viJ-
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lages and plant corn. This changed the situation and he withdrew the call
for volunteers. "20 The capture of Santa Anna, the treaty of Velasco, and the
retreat of Mexican troops from Texas seemed to settle the issue. General
Gaines was well pleased with his handling of the situation and believed he
had prevented widespread Indian hostilities along the border.21
Soon, however, it became known that authorities in Mexico City re-
fused to sanction the abandonment of Texas. General Jose Urrea replaced
General Vicente Filisola in command of the army with orders to halt the
retreat. regroup the scattered forces and return to the fray. When this in-
(ormation spread through Texas, Indian activities were again viewed with
apprehension.22
When the Mexican troops assembled at Matamoros and displayed in-
dications of renewing the war, the situation on the Sabine again changed.
General Gaines was convinced tribesmen had earlier committed depre-
dations upon the frontier and that some of the marauders were from the
United States. When renewed appeals from Texans began to pour into
Camp Sabine, he was convinced Mexicans were once more encouraging
the tribesmen to take the war path. Information regarding the destruction
ofFt. Parker on May 18 was received before the end of the month. On June
16. Sterling C. Robertson addressed Gaines an anguished appeaF3 and on
June 18 General Rusk, then at Victoria in command of the Texas army.
forwarded an urgent request for helpY
General Gaines believed Texans wished to be annexed to the United
States and that President Jackson wanted to see this occur before he left of-
fice. Personally he thought annexation a wise policy, good for all concerned
including "the whole people of the continent of America," and he feared
"embarrassing interference by foreign powers might result from delay-
ing OUf national action upon the subject to another session of Congress."
Therefore, on June 28 he renewed the call for volunteers and sent Acting
Inspector General E. A. Hitchcock to Washington to report the facts and
circumstances as they appeared on the frontier. including the readiness of
the army to proceed with any assignment it might be given.2S
He was convinced the time for annexation had arrived and planned
for quick and decisive military action. He replied to Robertson's request
for help that it was not clear the Caddoes had taken part in the recent
outrages but the evidence was sufficient to justify an investigation as soon
as the dragoons that he had ordered from Ft. Jesup arrived at Camp Sa-
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bine. He also requested all available helpful facts such as place designations
with intervening distances, the names of individuals along the roads who
might supply information of topography as well as enemy numbers and
locations.26
On July 10, 1836, General Gaines addressed an order with an enclo~
sure to the "officers commanding the United States troops at or near Tex-
as." This went to Ft. Towson. It said that information had been received
that among the Indians who had recently raided Robertson's colony were
some members of tribes residing within the states of Arkansas and Louisi-
ana. Therefore. he deemed it proper, in order to learn to what ext e n t
these Indians had participated in the attack. and at the same time to restrain
future incursions into Texas to direct the officer's attention to the matter.
For these purposes the Commandant at Pt. Towson was ordered to repair
with the forces under his command to the "town of Nacogdoches where he
would from time to time be occasionally stationed."27
The message was forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Whistler
then at Camp Benson near Ft. Towson in command of the troops who had
been ordered from Ft. Gibson to duty between Ft. Towson and Ft. Jesup.
Whistler with three companies of dragoons and six companies of infantry
had left Ft. Gibson on May 8, and after a rough and tedious march of nine
days, a distance of 190 miles, encamped near Red River on the 17 where
they had remained awaiting further orders. They supposed their destina-
tion would be the Sabine but were now directed to Nacogdoches where
17,400 rations had been sent. This consisted of 17,000 rations of flour with
a Illike quantity of the sma)) parts of the rations together with 8,500 rations
ofpork., with authority for a supply of beef, sufficient to complete the whole
supply of 17,400 rations."211
At Nacogdoches a position was to be taken that would "combine the
several advantages of strength. health and conifort." The camp was to be
fortified by a small breastwork constructed of light materials with block
houses at the opposite angles. The primary object of the occupation was
to enable General Gaines to carry into effect instructions from the War
Department dated May 12. If Colonel Whistler should find Indians from
the United States to be hostile, they were to be urged to return to their vil-
lages and remain peaceful. But should these or "any other Indians, or other
armed forces, be found with a warlike attitude, or in the act of any decided
hostility against the United States troops, or against any of the inhabitants
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of the frontier, or of the disputed territory to the south, or east, or north
of Nacogdoches, to employ force or otherwise restrain them from such
hostility" and to notify the commanding officer "of their position, probable
number and conduct." Whistler was promised full cooperation and support
of the troops at Ft. Towson and Camp Sabine but was cautioned to attack
only if hostility was demonstrated by conduct rather than by threats and al-
ways to be careful to conform to the enclosure from the War Department.29
On July 11 Gaines' Order No. 29 stated there were indications that
Indians in the area were making preparations for hostilities during the
summer and autumn. Upon this hypothesis all military movements along
the border were based and such activities were to be restrained by force if
necessary. To guard against surprise it was ordered that on any service re-
quiring a detachment be sent on duty expected to last two days or more, no
less than 200 infantrymen nor 150 mounted troops were to be employed.3D
This precaution was dictated by experience gained fighting the Seminoles.
On July 31 the troops arrived at Nacogdoches. Portions of a letter
published in the National Intelligencer, September IS, 1836, describes the
march from Ft. Towson. The trip took two weeks. Part of the country had
never been traveled before except by men on horseback and as the troops
were encumbered with ox teams, it was necessary to cut a road as they
advanced. The distance covered was about 200 miles. Camp was made on
a low hill upon "which Nacogdoches partly stands." The "firing of a small
piece of artillery on" their approach told of a favorable reception. The resi-
dents were "extremely polite and obliging but many of them have left the
town in consequence of the hostile attitude of the neighboring Indians,
who are said to be so numerous, that some do not consider the town safe
notwithstanding the presence of United States troops." The situation was
greatly improved by the arrival of General Houston with his staff on the
evening ofAugust 3. The General was suffering from the wound received at
San Jacinto and was still on crutches but his presence cheered and encour-
aged the townspeople.31
Residents ofNacogdoches were pleased to have the troops stationed in
their midst. They recognized communications were poor, transportation
difficult, and that a shortage of provisions would create problems. Freight
from Natchitoches was contracted for, when teams, and wagons were avail-
able, at $3.50 per hundred pounds but there were few teams and wagons as
well as a scarcity of drivers. Two barrels of flour per day were required for
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the troops and it was difficult to secure a continuous supply. Other provi-
sions were likewise scarce and expensive. Local citizens wished the soldiers
to remain and Colonel Henry Raguet informed the supply officer that he
would furnish some provisions at reduced prices. Beans and black-eyed
peas he would provide for $1.50 per bushel, the contract price was $2.00
plus transportation; candles, one fourth wax. at 20 cents per pound, and
salt at $2.50 per bushel of fifty pounds."
General Gaines continued to strengthen his forces along the border
while awaiting what he confidently believed would be favorable action on
the question of annexation. He was convinced the hostile attitude of the
Indians was a result of their belief that concentration of Mexican troops
at Matamoros would lead to the Texans being driven back into the United
States or suffering extermination. A display of strength, he thought highly
desirable, therefore, he built at Camp Sabine a block house and eight store-
houses twenty feet square, laid in a supply of 2.290 bushels of corn, and
"155,000 rations of subsistence of excellent quality:' and wrote the Secre-
tary of War the best plan of attack was to march directly toward the place
where the Indian women and children were located. This would bring the
warriors from their hiding and assure a fight." While these plans were be-
ing readied. General Gaines was ordered, early in October, to attend a mili-
tary court of inquiry at Frederick. Maryland."
The Mexican threat had not materialized, the Indians had not taken
the warpath, Washington had become cautious and no other military com-
mander recognized a need for action. General Arbuckle at Ft. Towson, left
in command, saw no evidence ofa threat of widespread Indian hostilities."
There appeared to be no further political or military advantage to be
gained by continued occupation of Nacogdoches. The camp was plagued
with indifference and low morale. On August 9, the three ranking officers.
Colonel Whistler, Captain Tenor and Captain Perkins were ill. The block-
houses ordered constructed had not been built. The dragoons were "en-
camped on a hill overlooking and commanding the town from the west:'
while the infantry was stationed "within the precinct of the town."" Early
in eptember, Colonel Whistler reported there had never been any dispo-
sition on the part of the Indians to attack the U. S. troops and if there had
ever been any intention to attack the Texans, it disappeared with the arrival
of the American soldiers." On October 13 he complained that his troops
had suffered a 400 mile march to afford protection to a foreign state." On
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November 30 General Macomb reported as far as he could determine
there were 428 United States regulars at Nacogdoches.39 The detachment
was withdrawn on December 18, 1836.40 The climate of public opinion at
Washington had changed and along the boundary the Indian menace had
become a domestic problem.
DIPLOMATIC BREAK WITH MEXICO
The concentration of troops on the border, the occupation of Nacog-
doches, and the suspected intentions of the administration and of General
Gaines raised questions that were reflected in the foreign policy and poli-
tics of the American people. The well known sympathies ofPresident Jack-
son and citizens throughout the United States for Texans and their cause
resulted in widespread disregard of the Neutrality Act of 1818. In the latter
part of 1835 and early 1836 violations ofthe spirit if not the letter of the law
were frequent t general and flagrant but repeated warnings from the State
Department and investigations by federal district attorneys failed to halt
aid going to Texas.4l
Mexican authorities were not satisfied that Washington was doing all
it could to maintain a neutral position. The situation was more difficult
because Mexico resented repeated efforts by the United States to buy the
province and indignantly rejected the claim that the Neches~ not the Sa-
bine, was the boundary. President Jackson did nothing to allay suspicion
when in his message to Congress December 7, 1835, he reported having
notified Mexico that in the event of trouble, the boundary must be respect-
ed alike by both the loyal and rebel regimes. Castillo, the Mexican envoy to
Washingtont inqUired at the State Department if this meant the President
referred to boundaries other than those described in treaties between the
two governments.42 Secretary Forsyth refused to discuss the statement of
the President, made to another branch of the government, with the repre-
sentatives of a foreign power.
Early in March, 1836, Manuel Edward Gorostiza appeared in the Unit-
ed States as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Mex-
ican government.43 He was an able and experienced diplomat and on April
4 complained to Forsyth about men being recruited and money subscribed
in some of the states for aid to Texas.44 The Secretary directed federal at-
torneys to see that the law was enforced but the looseness of the legislative
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language and the disposition of the public prevented successful prosecu-
tion ofseemingly obvious violations.
'The boundary between the two nations had never been located and
that portion forming the western limits of Arkansas and Louisiana was in
dispute. Gorostiza learned that General Gaines had been ordered to take
personal command and to concentrate troops along the border. On April
20 in a conference with Secretary of State Forsyth. he requested an expla-
nation.45
The Secretary entered into a long discourse on the subject. Gorostiza
said he was afraid he had not kept everything that was said in mind and
might have missed some of the points as they were presented in a foreign
language, therefore, requested a swnmary in writing. Forsyth agreed and
sent the envoy a memorandum. In this he declared that United States citi-
zens near Red River feared attacks by Indians from Mexican territory and
hostilities by Indians living in the United States against people living in
Mexico. This had induced the government to send troops to the border
but Mexico need have no fear, for if in the performance of his duties, the
commander crossed the line or occupied a position beyond what Mexico
supposed was the boundary, he would withdraw as soon as the danger was
passed. Washington had no intention ofhostile action or desire to establish
a possession or claim.46
Gorostiza replied that sending troops to the border could be regarded
by his country only as intervention in its domestic affairs. To his own gov-
ernment he wrote the measure could be viewed in no other light than aid
to the Texas rebels and that he would never consent for the Americans to
occupy one foot of Mexican soil. Should he learn the boundary had been
crossed, before receiving instructions on the subject, he would lodge a for-
mal protest and ask for his passport.47
Forsyth supposed Gorostiza had failed to grasp his meaning and tried
to explain. He said troops might be advanced to a position supposed by
Mexico to be within its territory. This was meant to be reassuring for he
had stated if it occurred, the soldiers would be withdrawn when peace was
restored, as the United States had no wish or intention to interfere in the
domestic affairs of its neighbor.48 Gorostiza replied that he noted with ap-
proval the assurances that United States troops would not take a position
on ground known to be beyond United States limits. Then he inquired if
this were true. would it not follow logically that no position would be oc-
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cupied on ground previously possessed by Mexico.49
His failure to be convincing and the adroitness of the Mexican, nettled
Forsyth. He tried again, repeating what he had said in slightly different
words with additional emphasis.so Gorostiza insisted that his arguments
had not been met nor his question answered. Therefore, nothing remained
but for him to notify his government in order that the Mexican command-
er might be given necessary instructions to deal with the situation if Gen-
eral Gaines advanced beyond the known boundary line.51
On May 9, Gorostiza returned to the subject. He inquired about a re-
port in the Globe that Secretary of War Cass on April 25 had authorized
General Gaines to advance to Nacogdoches, said to be within the limits of
the United StatesY Forsyth was irritated and replied at length emphasizing
that Gaines was not ordered to go to Nacogdoches, but rather not to go
beyond that point. He said this was an important distinction and the lan-
guage had been chosen carefully with the deliberate intention of avoiding
misconstruction of the motive l which was to protect the frontier against
the Indians. In fulfillment of the treaty terms. howeverl he declared troops
might be sent to the very heart of Mexico. Believing the protest was found-
ed upon the minister's wilful contentiousness or mistaken conviction that
the advance was to be used as a basis for a claim to territory. he proceeded
to remind Gorostiza that Mexico was not in possess of the area near the
boundary no matter where the line might be when finally established, and
claims ofboth countries were based upon terms of a treaty which provided
that the line would be located later by a joint commissionY Gorostiza re-
fused to admit the troops of a friendly power were authorized to enter, of
their own accord l territory of a neighbor no matter how benevolent their
objective. Such practice, he declared, would destroy the principle of the
independence of nations.54
The discussion appeared to be nearing a crisis when the news of San
Jacinto brought a change. Gorostiza realized his position had been weak-
ened but he did not abandon it. On May 24 he protested against a resolu-
tion introduced in Congress to recognize the independence of Texas5S For-
syth refused to discuss the subject and Gorostiza was quiet for a while but
on July 9 he was informed that his government was determined to pros-
ecute the war in Texas and considered any agreement or promise made by
Santa Anna as null and void. Soon he heard that Gaines had again received
permission to occupy Nacogdoches. He inqUired at the State Department
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regarding the truth of the report. Forsyth replied that he did not know but
would ask the War Department, and later he told Gorostiza the rumor was
false.56
On July 28 Gorostiza wrote Acting Secretary of State Dickins that he
had heard General Gaines had announced his intention to occupy Na-
cogdoches. He observed that it was a "very singular coincidence that only
when the Mexican troops were advancing in Texas, those accounts of the
excesses of Indians are invented or exaggerated, in order that they may,
without doubt, reach the ears of General Gaines. If He also complained of a
series of unneutral acts on the part of United States citizens and asked that
this communication be laid before the President as the continuation ofhis
mission depended upon the answer.57 A reply on August 1 defended the
Secretary of War in ordering General Gaines to go as far as Nacogdoches
and reiterated the declaration that the United States sought only to pre-
serve peace and order along the border.58
On August 2, Gorostiza inquired if the government had confirmation
of reports that General Gaines had occupied Nacogdoches.59 He was told
the last dispatches received at the War Department indicated the General
was at Camp Sabine. Two days later, August 4, he presented a strong protest
against the order authorizing the occupation of Nacogdoches; on the same
theory he said, a Mexican general might occupy Natchitoches to protect
against Indians that might be reported planning to enter Mexico.60
He knew Gaines was authorized to occupy Nacogdoches but was un-
able to learn whether troops had been sent to that position. He did learn
that authorization had been dispatched the day before Forsyth had told
him he was not informed on the subject. He wrote his government, III think
that no commentaries are needed, to show the true character and value of
such conduct."61 Any confidence he might have had in the honesty and
integrity of the American administration was completely destroyed.
With no expectation of influencing the action of the United States
government Gorostiza continued to call attention to alleged unneutral
acts. On September 10 he wrote that he was convinced Nacogdoches had
been occupied and called for replies to his protests.62 In a personal inter-
view September 23, Forsyth sought, without success, to allay the indignant
minister's apprehensions and two days later showed him parts of letters
from President Jackson to General Gaines in which the President directed
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withdrawal from Nacogdoches if the Indian menace was over. However, if
hostilities were threatened or in progress, he was authorized to call 2000
volunteers from Arkansas and Missouri and advance his entire force to
Nacogdoches or any other position more favorable for the protection of the
frontier. The letters specifically informed Gaines that he was to act upon
his own discretion based upon the information available to him, bearing in
mind the neutral position ofhis country.63
Gorostiza knew he was achieving nothing and had lost hope of any
success but on October 1, he protested against United States military aid to
Texas and demanded a reply to his request for withdrawal of troops from
Nacogdoches.64 On October 13) Acting Secretary of State Dickins refused
to promise withdrawal.65 Gorostiza realized the resources of diplomacy
were exhausted and on October 15 asked for his passport.66
JACKSON'S CHANGE OF EMPHASIS
President Jackson approved military action along the Arkansas-Lou-
isiana boundary when the revolt in Texas first came to his attention. This
he indicated in his annual message to Congress December 7. 1835, then
emphasized more strongly in March) 1836. when a letter from General T. J.
Green to Colonel J. B. Manny in command at Ft. Jesup reached him by way
of the Adjutant General's office. This was an appeal for protection against
Indians alleged to be crossing from the United States to Texas. Jackson
wrote on the letter a message to the Secretary of War directing him to give
instructions immediately to the commanding officer at Ft. Jesup to "arrest
all individuals who under the order of General Santa Anna, are engaged
in eXciting Indians to war) and to notify all concerned that all his military
forces will be employed to put down or support our neutrality.. "67
The administration decided to mobilize enough troops to enforce its
will along the border. General Gaines was placed in command and for-
warded instructions by Secretary of War Cass dated April 25, 1836 autho-
rizing him to occupy Nacogdoches ifin his opinion it seem advisable.68 On
April 8, before Cass' letter was written, Gaines called on the governors for
volunteers,69 and by order of the President, the call was approved before
Congress enacted the necessary legislation.7o Details of this action soon
became known and from numerous quarters questions and criticism ap-
peared.
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Niles Register. May 7. stated that General Gaines appeared to feel called
upon to prevent Indians from taking part in the war then raging in Texas.
He was quoted as saying orders from the President required him lito re-
main entirely neutral and to cause that neutrality to be respected." The edi-
tor observed that the General could interpret his orders to authorize mili-
tary action as far west as the Sabine and ifhe did so, war with Mexico might
be precipitated. The conclusion ofsuch a conflict could not be foreseen and
"we trust that however strong sympathies in favor of our countrymen who
are emigrants in Texas may be, nothing will be done by an American officer
to tarnish the high character of the United States for national propriety and
good faith. tI This was the first mention in the Register of the situation. and
it did not go unnoticed at Washington.7]
The next issue was more severe in its criticism and attacked the Presi-
dent directly. It declared the Texas question had assumed an entirely new
aspect so far as the United States was concerned. The Executive had under-
taken to claim territory over which the Mexican government had there-
tofore exercised jurisdiction, including "Old Fort Nacogdoches" and had
ordered General Gaines to cross the Sabine and occupy that post. In the
opinion of this paper. under no construction of the treaties could United
States boundaries be considered to include Nacogdoches. The editor felt
"so clear indeed is this question that no person, even moderately acquaint-
ed with the geography ofthe country on both sides of the Sabine would any
more regard the Neches as the main stream of the Sabine than they would
the Shenandoah as the main stream of the Potomac or the Juaniata as that
of the Susquehannah." The hope was expressed that Mexico would not re-
sort to war but under no construction of treaties could the United States
boundaries be considered to include Nacogdoches. In the opinion of the
editor, he would be wanting in his duty to his readers "if he did not warn
them of the imminent danger of the nation being involved in a war which
could not be otherwise than disastrous to the western frontier no matter
how fortunate we may be in its prosecution or victorious in termination."
So long as there were no IIlatent ulterior purposes" there was no objection
on the part of the Register to any measure to protect the frontier but this
had the appearance of a mask for conquest.72
Criticism spread and on May 10. the National Intelligencer published a
letter written by General Macomb dated April 25. in which he questioned
General Gaines' judgment in caning upon the governors for volunteers.
32 EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL
The letter was assumed to give the true picture. and editorially the paper
attacked the administration's policy,?3 Criticism in Congress was also in-
creased and its overall strength was not easy to determine.74 The adminis-
tration was impressed. If Macomb's letter presented the real situation, the
President feared a mounting crusade ofopposition and it was decided this
might be prevented by a restatement of policy designed to end criticism in
the press, discussion in Congress, and to rally the public to the administra-
tion's support. Information on the situation in the President's possession
had been called for by Congress. A reply was withheld and on May 12,
Secretary Cass wrote General Gaines that the President wished him to act
with great caution and in no way compromise the nation's neutrality. If In-
dians were not then employed along the border, there was no need to pass
beyond territory heretofore occupied by the United States. In any event he
was not to advance unless circumstances showed the step necessary for the
protection of United States territory and then to return across the line as
soon as the situation would permit,75 There could be little if any criticism
ofsuch policy and on May 14 the correspondence. including this letter. was
sent to Congress. The procedure was effective, criticism abated.
Policy was not changed but an element of caution had been intro-
duced. On July II, however, Secretary Cass replied to Gaines' letter of the
previous June 7, saying that if the General considered it necessary he might
advance as far as Nacogdoches without hesitation since the President ap-
proved.76 This was directly contrary to the impression conveyed by the let-
ter of May 12. Jackson had seen danger signals and when Gaines renewed
his call for volunteers, the Chief Executive took measures to forestall a re-
vival of criticism.77
Delays incidental to the adjournment of Congress and the President's
trip to Tennessee afforded the needed time for deliberate action. Jackson
decided to halt recruiting of volunteers in the states where there was the
greatest enthusiasm for the Texas cause and most persistent demands for
annexation. This would tend to reduce consideration of the subject where
there was most pressure for action. On August 5 from the Hermitage. Jack-
son wrote Governor Cannon of Tennessee that he believed the sanction of
so large a mobilization as called for by General Gaines would furnish Mex-
ico reasons for supposing the United States might be persuaded by inad-
equate cause to overstep the line of strict neutrality. He criticized Cannon
for assuming that authorization for a requisition in May applied equally to
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another in June and declared Gaines had based the latest call upon obliga-
tions inconsistent with the administration's policy,78
Writing apparently for public view, Jackson told Cannon "should
Mexico insult our flag, invade our territory or interfere with our citizens in
their lawful pursuit then the Government would promptly repel the insult
and take speedy reparation for the injury." No such offense, he said, had
been committed or believed by General Gaines to have been committed.
Before he left Washington, he asserted, the Secretary of War had been di-
rected to inform General Gaines of a new plan that had been made un-
der the Volunteer Act approved by the last session of Congress. This gave
Gaines the authority, in case of need. to call up 1000 men from each of the
states of Arkansas and Missouri, at the same time withdrawing authority
for requisitions upon the other governors. He believed there were no rea-
sons to justify fear ofextensive Indian hostilities but should more troops be
needed, they could be called from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Kentucky.79
Critics were again silenced. On August 20 an editorial in Niles Register
stated that the letter was "dignified and appropriate and must disabuse the
public mind as to the alleged sentiments and conduct of that functionary
in the contest of the Texians with Mexico." It had appeared from reports by
General Gaines that he was acting with the sanction and upon the advice of
the President, this was now proved not to be the case.80 The National Intelli-
gencer was quoted as saying "we consider the document to be of an impor-
tance scarcely inferior to that of the proclamation ofneutrality of 1793."81
Jackson's ultimate goal had not changed. He wanted Texas; he also
wanted Van Buren to succeed him at the White House; and he was waiting
for a report from Henry Morfit. his agent in Texas. His reasons for halting
troop concentration on the border were: first, he feared criticism would
hurt Van Buren·s chances ofbeing elected; second, he did not want to make
the annexation ofTexas more difficult by giving opponents grounds for op-
position; and third) he believed Texas was in no immediate danger ofbeing
conquered by a weak., divided. and discouraged Mexico. Unlike General
Gaines, he did not think it absolutely necessary to annex Texas during the
life of the present Congress.82
On September 4 the President wrote General Gaines that his policy
was as it had always been, strict neutrality "unless the necessity exists, un-
less there are actual disturbances of the peace on the frontier, or a moral
certainty that the Indians in hostile array for the purpose are draWing the
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means of operation from the territory of Mexico the occupation of an ad-
vanced post in that territory by our troops must be avoided."83 Before this
message was sent. Jackson received the letter Gaines had written Secretary
Cass on July 21 in which he described reports of renewed activities by In-
dians in Texas. In reply the President authorized the General if the state-
ments were true, to occupy Nacogdoches with his entire command.84
Jackson conveyed one impression to the public and an entirely dif-
ferent one to General Gaines. The technique was successful and General
Gaines did what he could to promote the cause of annexation and the pub-
lic lauded the President for his firm stand in protecting American rights
and preserving "strict neutrality."
JEALOUS GENERALS
Military activity along the Texas border added fuel to an ancient con-
troversy among the generals of the army: Generals Gaines and Scott began
feuding before the War of 1812 dosed, but they both emerged as Brevit
Major Generals. This resulted in a continuation of their personal war since
each hoped to retain the pay of the brevit rank. In 1821 the number of
Major Generals in the army was reduced to one by act ofCongress. Gaines
and Scott were applicants for the place. each considered the other to be the
principal obstacle in the way of his promotion. Bitterness between them
increased until in 1824 Scott challenged Gaines to a duel. Gaines haughtily
refused to fight because army regul ations forbade and he had consistently
opposed lithe code duelle." His friends defended him and pointed out that
Scott had drawn the anti-dueling provision in army regulations and had
refused to fight Jackson because of "patriotic scruples. "85
In February~ 1828, General in Chief of the army. Jacob Brown, died
and the Adams administration had to select a successor. An active cam-
paign was launched by both Gaines and Scott. Partisans of each joined
in the contest. Charges and counter charges. letters and pamphlets were
issued in great numbers. Congressmen brought what pressure they could
upon the administration. In general. representatives from the Northwest
favored William H. Harrison; those from the upper South urged the claims
of Scott; New England backed Macomb; and the lower South supported
Gaines. In addition each had partisans scattered across the states.86
In the cabinet the appointment was a matter of grave consideration.
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The President was annoyed with both Gaines and Scott as well as with
the tactics of their friends. Secretary of State Clay was bitterly opposed
to Gaines because he considered himself to have been insulted in 1825 by
Lieutenant Edward G. W Butler. an aide to Gaines. The General had ten-
dered his apologies but Clay threatened to resign from the cabinet if he
received the appointment.s7 On an occasion when the appointment was
the subject of discussion, the President asked Richard Rusk. Secretary of
the Treasury~his opinion. Rusk objected to both Gaines and Scott and sug-
gested Alexander Macomb, Brevet Brigadier General and Chief Engineer
of the Army.88 This seemed an acceptable way out of the empass and Ma-
comb received the appointment which served to broaden the controversy
and intensify the bitterness. Gaines, Scott and their friends were indignant.
They loosed a barrage of criticism of the appointment and the appointee.
Scott announced he would not obey orders from Macomb and on at least
two occasions refused to return the salute of his superior. It
Gaines publicly supported Jackson's candidacy for the preSidency in
1828 and was jubilant at his election. On November 22, after the results
were known, he wrote the President-elect congratulations and invited
him, if he came by Kingsport, Tennessee, on his way to Washington, to
stay at least one night with the Gaines family.9O This friendship gradually
cooled until by 1830 Gaines felt he was no longer in the good graces of the
President. He attributed this to his known dislike of Eaton, Jackson's first
Secretary of War; his approval of Jackson's earlier decision not to seek a
second term; and the influence yielded by the political friends of Scott and
Macomb.
On January 23. 1836 General Gaines was transferred to the Arkansas-
Louisiana border from the command in Florida and General Scott was or-
dered to assume direction of the campaign against the Seminoles. This war
was being waged in an area where the President had won military fame and
was supposed to have an especial knowledge and interest in the activities.
General Gaines had achieved some success in organizing the campaign
and in the fighting he felt that he was destined to achieve total victory, so
Scott's appointment was resented and attributed to political manipulations
at Washington.91 In the new command the situation was different. condi-
tions would have to be appraised, plans made, troops and equipment pro-
cured and if success were achieved, it might be attributed to factors other
than military leadership. Gaines felt his rival was being favored.
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Each general, with the support ofhis friends~ continued to seek oppor-
tunities to promote his professional career. General Macomb learned that
Gaines had called upon several governors including White of Louisiana
for volunteers. No official action was taken at Baton Rouge and on April
25 Macomb wrote Secretary of War that the governor thought he was not
authorized by law to honor the requisition. He was reporting the affair~ he
said t because it was understood troops were to be used to check the Cad-
does and this seemed unnecessary since the country was not invaded and
not likely to be. He suggested that General Gaines had been deceived by a
group of land speculators who had led him to believe Mexican authorities
were tampering with the Indians in the hope of stimulating people in the
United States to pressure authorities to tend aid to Texas. He declared that
General Gaines had enough soldiers of the regular army to carry out his
instructions.92
Macomb's criticisms had little basis in fact and should have carried no
weight in administrative circles. He was known to be jealous ofGaines, had
not been near the frontier, knew of the situation only by rumor and what
he had read in the public press. In addition t he misrepresented the posi-
tion ofGovernor White who had explained that he hesitated to call out the
militia because of lack of funds and. since the legislature was not in session t
before the men could be mobilized the time for service specified in the
call would have expired. But the subject of the principal persons involved
were controversial and Macombts letter found its way into the newspapers
and provoked discussion over the country and in Congress. Niles Register
charged that General Gaines was irresponsible and was about to start a war
that would blight the high character ofhis colintry.93
Friends of the generals were again arrayed in defense of their respec-
tive champions. Many of the men in public life in 1828 were still influential
and few appear to have changed their opinions regarding the merits or
demerits of the military leaders. The discussion in Congress resulted in a
call upon the President for all the documents relating to the frontier and
General Gaines.94 The administration determined to permit no disturbing
political issues to arise, and moved cautiously. The Secretary of War wrote
Gaines to restrict his activities, if feasible, to United States soil. Gaines pro-
tested that Macombts letter had produced a change in the thinking on the
Potomac, he had only 1600 men to defend 400 miles of frontier and had
Gen. Macomb been acquainted with the situation he would never have
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committed so manyerrors.9S
Bickering continued and when news reached Washington that troops
had occupied Nacogdoches, charges and countercharges were renewed.
Amos Kendall, one of the President's trusted advisers, urged that Gaines
be recalled.96 1his advice was not followed hut Jackson did scold Gaines l
not for what he did, but for permitting a distorted image of administrative
policy to emerge as a threat to the uneasy calm of national politics.
The four and a half months occupation left little imprint upon Na-
cogdoches and East Texas. It did, however, make Nacogdoches, the Sabine
River, and East Texas well known to people in the United States. It also
brought about a break in diplomatic relations between Washington and
Mexico, produced criticism which stimulated President Jackson to action
that in men of lesser stature might have been regarded as duplicity, and
served as a vehicle for the return, as a political issue, of the ancient rivalry
between generals of the army.
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